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The	Ethics	of	Ethics	and	the	Ethics	of	Architecture	
Ben	Sweeting,	University	of	Brighton,	UK		
Abstract	In	 designing	 architecture	 we	 put	 forward	 ways	 in	 which	 to	 live,	 enabling	 particular	patterns	 of	 living	 while	 limiting	 other	 possibilities.	 In	 this	 sense	 architecture	 has	 a	normative	 function	 and	 can	 be	 compared	 to	 the	 way	 that	 ethical	 theories	 and	moral	codes	 purport	 to	 guide	 us	 on	 how	 to	 live.	 Given	 this,	 I	 suggest	 that	 ethical	 reflection	about	 how	 we	 design—and	 in	 particular	 about	 how	 we	 constitute	 the	 relationship	between	 designers	 and	 those	 they	 design	 for—can	 be	 used	 to	 help	 formulate	 ethical	questions	regarding	how	we	speak	and	reason	about	ethics	itself.	Recognising	Heinz	von	Foerster’s	criticisms	of	moral	codes	as	an	instance	of	this,	I	use	the	example	of	designing	architecture	 to	 challenge	 and	 extend	 von	 Foerster’s	 position,	 suggesting	 the	 recursive	application	of	ethics	to	its	own	discourse.		
Relating	design	and	ethics	In	 relating	 systems	 thinking	 and	 design,	 one	 possible	 focus	 is	 that	 of	 ethics	 and	especially	 those	 ethical	 quandaries	 that	 designers	 encounter.	 Similarly	 to	 calls	 for	designers	 to	 learn	 from	 moral	 philosophy	 in	 order	 to	 grapple	 more	 fully	 with	 the	challenges	 they	 face	(e.g.	Schrijver,	2013;	Spector,	2001),	 integration	between	systems	thinking	and	design	can	enable	the	ethical	reflections	of	the	former	(such	as	e.g.	second-order	cybernetics,	as	discussed	below)	to	inform	the	latter.			It	 is	 important,	 however,	 not	 to	 characterise	 such	 a	 relationship	 as	 one-directional.	While,	as	Spector	notes,	moral	philosophy	is	a	“heretofore	ignored	source	of	guidance”	(Spector,	2001,	p.	x)	for	designers	to	draw	upon,	it	is	not	as	if	it	is	a	consistent	body	of	theory	that	can	be	straightforwardly	applied:	depending	on	which	theories	or	ideas	we	refer	 to	we	 receive	 different,	 and	 often	 directly	 conflicting,	 guidance	 as	 to	what	 to	 do	(see	 e.g.	 MacIntyre,	 1981/1985,	 pp.	 6-7).	 As	 I	 have	 discussed	 elsewhere	 (Sweeting,	2015c),	 some	 of	 the	 most	 common	 approaches	 to	 normative	 ethics	 (deontology,	consequentialism)	 rely	 on	procedures	 (predefined	 rules,	 optimisation)	 that	 have	been	shown	to	be	unworkable	in	the	complex	situations	that	designers	commonly	encounter	and	deal	with	as	a	matter	of	course.	The	process	of	exchange	between	systems	thinking	and	 design	 that	 is	 a	 focus	 of	 both	 this	 conference	 series	 and	 recent	 cybernetics	 (e.g.	Glanville,	2007,	2014;	Sweeting,	2015a)	is	notable	for	working	in	both	directions,	with	the	seemingly	messier	qualities	of	design	as	it	is	practiced	informing	our	understanding	of	systems	as	well	as	vice	versa.	Likewise,	while	we	tend	to	think	of	the	relation	between	ethics	and	design	as	 the	application	of	ethical	 theory	to	design	practice,	we	might	also	look	 to	 the	 ethical	 qualities	 and	 quandaries	 of	 design	 activity	 itself	 with	 a	 view	 to	informing	our	understanding	of	ethics	more	generally.			In	this	paper	I	explore	this	 topic	by	taking	architecture	 in	particular	as	a	 focus.	This	 is	partly	because	it	is	my	own	discipline,	but	also	because	of	the	sorts	of	ethical	questions	that	 architecture	prompts	 about	how	we	design.	Architecture	 is	 too	big	 to	be	 avoided	(we	don’t	opt	in	to	it),	yet	it	is	also	so	intimate	that	it	constrains	and	structures	everyday	life.	 While	 technological	 change	 is	 slow	 to	 impact	 on	 architecture,	 this	 bind	 mirrors	many	 of	 the	 ethical	 complexities	 that	 follow	 from	 the	 reach	 of	 contemporary	 socio-technical	systems	(as	discussed	 in	 this	conference;	e.g.	Fiore,	2016).	Ethical	debates	 in	architecture	can,	therefore,	be	understood	as	specific	instances	of	wider	issues.		
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The	argument	 that	 I	put	 forward	here	 is	 somewhat	unusual	 in	 structure.	My	concerns	are	not	with	ethical	issues	in	architecture	per	se.	Rather,	by	reviewing	Karsten	Harries’	formulation	 of	 the	 shared	 concerns	 between	 architecture	 and	 ethics,	 I	 suggest	 that	ethical	 questions	 regarding	 how	 we	 design	 architecture—and	 particularly	 those	regarding	 the	 relationship	 between	 designers	 and	 those	 they	 design	 for—parallel	similar	questions	regarding	how	we	speak	and	reason	about	ethics	more	generally,	such	as	those	raised	by	Heinz	von	Foerster	(1992)	regarding	moral	codes.	I	use	the	example	of	designing	architecture	to	challenge	and	extend	von	Foerster’s	position	and,	building	on	this,	suggest	how	we	might	question	instances	of	ethical	discourse	in	ethical	terms.		
The	normative	function	of	architecture	One	 major	 contribution	 to	 architectural	 debates	 about	 ethics	 is	 that	 of	 philosopher	Karsten	Harries	(1987,	1997),	who	has	suggested	understanding	architecture	in	ethical	terms	because	of	 the	way	 it	puts	 forward	an	ethos	or	way	of	 life.	Referring	 to	Ludwig	Wittgenstein’s	 (1953/2009)	 summary	 of	 the	 philosophical	 questions	 as	 those	 of	 the	form	 “I	 don't	 know	 my	 way	 about”,	 Harries	 characterises	 the	 role	 of	 philosophy	 as	helping	 us	 to	 navigate	 profound	 uncertainties	 about	 how	 to	 live	 and	 goes	 on	 to	recognise	 common	 cause	 with	 architecture	 in	 this	 task	 (Harries,	 1987,	 p.	 29).	 As	 an	attempt	to	recapture	something	of	the	social	mission	of	modernist	architecture,	Harries	contrasts	 his	 account	 with	 the	 context	 of	 postmodernist	 architectural	 theory	 and	practice	in	which	he	wrote,	as	well	as	with	the	way	that	philosophy	has	tended	to	treat	architecture	in	largely	aesthetic	terms	as	a	branch	of	the	philosophy	of	art.		In	trying	to	work	through	how	architecture	might	fulfil	what	he	describes	as	its	“ethical	function”,	Harries	turns	to	phenomenology,	the	work	of	Martin	Heidegger	and	the	theme	of	dwelling.	As	his	argument	develops	it	becomes	entangled	with	some	of	the	difficulties	that	come	with	these	ideas,	such	as	in	characterising	some	communities	as	being	more	or	less	rooted	or	authentic	than	others,	a	position	that	has	been	effectively	critiqued	by	Neil	Leach	(2005)	amongst	others.		My	concerns,	however,	are	less	with	the	direction	in	which	Harries	develops	his	account	than	where	he	starts	it.	Harries’	observation	that	architecture	puts	forward	a	way	of	life	does	 not	 have	 to	 be	 thought	 of	 in	 terms	 of	 grand	 themes	 such	 as	 dwelling	 and	authenticity,	nor	in	the	sense	of	modernism’s	social	agenda.	It	can	instead	be	understood	in	 much	 more	 prosaic	 terms:	 in	 an	 everyday	 sense,	 architecture	 enables	 particular	patterns	 of	 living	 while	 limiting	 other	 possibilities.	 This	 impact	 makes	 designing	architecture	 ethically	 significant	 even	where	 there	 do	 not	 seem	 to	 be	 grand	 issues	 at	stake,	such	that	Harries’	position	can	be	reformulated	in	less	escalated	terms.	Whatever	architects’	 intentions,	 we	 can	 understand	 architecture	 in	 similar	 terms	 to	 ethical	theories,	moral	codes	and	the	like	in	that	it	is	normative	in	orientation,	putting	forward	ways	in	which	others	are	to	live.	While	this	is	by	no	means	an	exact	analogy,	it	raises	a	number	of	possibilities	worth	pursuing	further.		
Designing	for	others	While	debate	 over	 the	 ethical	 qualities	 of	 buildings	 themselves	 is	 a	 significant	 area	 of	discourse	 in	 architectural	 theory	 (e.g.	 the	 way	 a	 building	 might	 embody	 an	 ethical	quality,	 or	 might	 be	 an	 agent	 in	 an	 ethical	 issue),	 the	 issue	 of	 how	 architecture	 is	designed	is	an	area	of	concern	in	its	own	right.	This	goes	beyond	issues	of	professional	ethics	and	is	not	limited	to	only	how	architects	respond	to	explicit	ethical	challenges	in	their	 work	 such	 as,	 say,	 environmental	 impact.	 In	 even	 the	 most	 straightforward	circumstances	there	is	still	the	question	of	the	relationship	between	designers	and	those	they	design	 for,	where	 there	 is	 an	asymmetry	between	 those	with	agency	over	design	
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decisions	 and	 those	 affected	by	 these	 decisions	 and	 the	norms	 they	 establish.	 That	 is,	questions	of	ethics	in	architecture	regard	not	just	buildings	and	their	consequences	but	also	the	processes	and	relationships	through	which	buildings	are	produced.		Designing	 architecture	 involves	 something	 of	 a	 bind,	 which	 can	 be	 summarised	 as	 a	combination	 of	 significance,	 contestability	 and	 asymmetry.	Most	 design	 questions	 are	not	satisfactorily	a	matter	of	the	preference	of	the	designer,	as	they	impact	on	others	in	significant	ways.	However,	neither	can	they	be	resolved	objectively	(for	reasons	that	are	well	 established;	 see	 for	 instance	Rittel	&	Webber,	 1973).	 It	 follows	 that	 even	 though	they	 are	not	 a	matter	 of	 personal	 preference,	many	design	decisions	 can	nevertheless	only	be	a	matter	of	opinion.			With	similar	situations	in	everyday	contexts	we	will	often	try	to	find	consensus	amongst	all	 those	 who	 will	 be	 affected	 by	 the	 decision.	 In	 some	 specific	 contexts	 such	 as	healthcare,	participative	design	methods	have	bridged	this	relationship	(as	presented	at	this	conference	by	Sanders,	2016).	It	is	difficult,	however,	to	apply	such	strategies	more	generally:	the	impact	of	architecture	is	so	great	that	we	cannot	in	principle	consult	every	stakeholder	 (consider,	 for	 instance,	 the	 passer	 by	 and	 the	 future	 user),	 let	 alone	 find	agreement	amongst	them.	I	return	to	how	designers	respond	to	this	challenge	below.		
Applying	ethics	to	itself	This	 is	 suggestive	 of	 a	 further	 parallel.	 If	 there	 is	 a	 sense	 in	 which	 we	 can	 see	architecture	 and	 theories	 of	 normative	 ethics	 in	 similar	 terms,	 then	 the	 designing	 of	architecture,	 in	 turn,	 sits	 parallel	 to	 the	 setting	out	 of	 such	 theories.	 That	we	 can	 ask	ethical	questions	of	the	former	suggests	that	we	might	also	do	so	of	the	latter,	such	that	how	we	speak	and	reason	about	ethics	might	also	be	questioned	in	ethical	terms.		It	 is	not	common	to	turn	ethics	on	itself	 in	this	way.	As	normative	ethical	theories	and	moral	 codes	are	put	 forward	on	 the	basis	 that	 they	give	guidance	as	 to	 ethically	 good	actions,	 they	 do	 not	 invite	 reflection	 on	 how	 they	 themselves	 are	 discussed	 or	propagated,	with	the	complexities	of	such	issues	tending	to	be	hidden	under	the	catchall	of	 application	 or	 behind	 assumptions	 of	 self-justification.	 Whereas	 the	 field	 of	 meta-ethics	 is	 oriented	 towards	 theories	 about	 the	 status	 of	 ethical	 theory,	 the	 analogy	 via	design	suggests	that	we	could	also	apply	ethics	to	itself,	leading	to	the	recursive	field	of	the	ethics	of	ethics.	That	is,	 if	we	recognise	how	we	reflect	on,	reason	and	speak	about	ethics	as	something	that	we	do,	it	is	something	to	which,	in	turn,	ethical	considerations	apply.		In	addressing	this	sort	of	self-reflexive	question	it	makes	sense	to	turn	to	cybernetics,	a	field	specifically	concerned	with	forms	such	as	this,	notably	in	the	case	of	second-order	cybernetics	(the	cybernetics	of	cybernetics)	as	developed	by	Heinz	von	Foerster	(1992,	1974/1995,	1979/2003)	and	others,	and	which	has	close	connections	with	both	ethics	and	design	 (e.g.	 Glanville,	 2004,	 2007,	 2014;	Herr,	 2015;	 Sweeting,	 2015a).	 Indeed,	 to	understand	 von	Foerster’s	 (1992)	much	 referenced	 remarks	 on	 ethics	 in	 terms	of	 the	application	of	ethics	to	itself	is	in	line	with	recent	interpretations	of	his	work	that	have	emphasised	its	recursive	qualities	(see	e.g.	Riegler	&	Müller,	2014).		Von	Foerster	 (1992),	 like	Harries,	draws	on	Wittgenstein,	 founding	his	argument	on	a	quotation	from	the	Tractatus:	“it	is	clear	that	ethics	cannot	be	articulated”	(Wittgenstein,	1921/1974,	6.421,	von	Foerster's	own	translation).	That	is,	in	putting	ethics	into	words,	such	as	 in	moral	 codes,	we	concern	ourselves	with	what	others	should	do	rather	 than	with	 our	 own	 actions.	 Von	 Foerster	 suggests	 that,	 instead,	 we	 keep	 our	 ethical	consideration	 implicit	 in	 our	 action,	 putting	 ethics	 into	 practice	 rather	 than	words.	 In	
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doing	so	he	criticises	moral	codes	in	ethical	terms	as	leading	towards	moralisation	and	away	from	responsibility.		Von	Foerster’s	critique	of	moral	codes	resonates	with	the	summary	I	have	given	of	the	challenge	of	designing	for	others	in	terms	of	contestability,	significance	and	asymmetry.	Given	 the	 contestability	 and	 significance	 of	 answers	 to	 complex	 ethical	 questions,	 the	asymmetry	 of	 moral	 codes	 is	 ethically	 suspect.	 The	 proponents	 of	 a	 moral	 code	may	justify	themselves	by	understanding	what	they	put	forward	as	being	true,	removing	one	element	of	the	bind.	Such	a	position,	however,	relies	on	assertion	and	is	undermined	by	the	general	level	of	disagreement	of	such	matters,	with	rival	premises	not	just	in	conflict	but	incommensurable	with	each	other.	As	Terry	Eagleton	(2003,	p.	229)	has	noted,	we	might	expect	to	agree	on	general	principles	and	diverge	on	particulars,	yet	we	have	no	common	view	on	many	everyday	ethical	questions.		
Keeping	ethics	implicit	Understood	 in	these	terms,	we	can	think	about	one	element	of	 the	ethical	challenge	of	designing	architecture	in	terms	of	avoiding	moralisation.	This	is	not	surprising	given	the	high-handed	 tone	 adopted	 by	 the	 modern	 movement	 and	 critiques	 of	 architects	 as	pursuing	their	own	agendas	at	the	expense	of	those	they	design	for	(e.g.	Till,	2009).	It	is	possible,	 however,	 to	 run	 this	 connection	 in	 the	 other	 direction,	 to	 take	 positive	examples	 from	design	practice	and	see	how	they	might	 inform	von	Foerster’s	position	and	the	issues	he	raises.		While	von	Foerster’s	account	has	much	to	commend	it	(and	is	worth	exploring	in	more	detail	than	the	brief	summary	I	have	given),	it	is	difficult	to	see	how	such	a	stance	can	be	maintained	 in	 practice.	 There	 are,	 for	 instance,	 situations	 where	 ethics	 needs	 to	 be	discussed	 explicitly,	 where	 not	 doing	 so	 would	 lead	 to	 acquiescence	 rather	 than	responsibility,	where	our	responsibility	includes	responsibility	for	others	and	so	cannot	be	 confined	 to	 the	personal,	 or	where	our	 actions	 articulate	 ethics	whichever	way	we	compose	our	language.	To	take	designing	a	building	as	an	example,	we	cannot	in	the	end	keep	 ethics	 implicit	 because	 architecture	 itself	 is	 an	 articulation	 of	 a	way	 of	 living,	 as	discussed	 above.	 Indeed,	 intervening	 in	 the	 lives	 of	 others	 is	 the	 very	 point	 of	 the	discipline:	 one	 would	 not	 want	 an	 architecture	 that	 was	 not	 a	 significant	 act	 in	 the	world,	creating	new	possibilities	in	some	way.		Designers	 have	 many	 ways	 of	 responding	 to	 this	 challenge,	 often	 by	 involving	 other	stakeholders	 in	 the	 design	 process,	whether	 through	 participatory	 design	methods	 or	more	standard	forms	of	consultation.	As	I	have	suggested	elsewhere,	the	core	methods	that	designers	use	in	addressing	the	complex	situations	they	face	take	a	conversational	form	 that,	 seen	 in	 cybernetic	 terms,	 implicitly	 involves	 a	 number	 of	 ethical	considerations	(Kenniff	&	Sweeting,	2014;	Sweeting,	2014,	2015b,	2015c).	For	instance,	the	 interactive	way	 in	which	designers	work	enables	 them	to	think	though	the	eyes	of	those	others	they	design	for	(Cf.	von	Foerster,	1991)	even	in	the	drawings	and	models	they	construct	primarily	 for	 themselves,	 for	 instance	 in	the	way	they	“walk	through”	a	plan.	Similarly,	design	activity	involves	the	pursuit	of	internal	not	just	external	purposes	(external	 purposes	 shift	 during	 the	process	 as	 new	 criteria	 emerge)	 and	 the	 taking	of	personal	responsibility	(objective	methods	being	unworkable).		This	is	not	to	say	that	designers	always	do	this	or	do	so	effectively.	Still	less	is	it	a	claim	that	 design	 practice	 is	 always	 ethically	 good	 or	 that	 designers’	 ideas	 are	 ethically	authoritative,	 as	 is	 clear,	 indeed,	 from	 the	history	of	 that	 architecture	which	has	been	put	 forward	 in	heroically	 ethical	 terms.	We	 can,	 however,	 understand	design	 as	being	ethical	 in	 a	 different	 sense,	 as	 implicitly	 involving	 and	 being	 concerned	 with	 ethical	
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considerations	 and	 questioning,	 in	 a	 similar	 sense	 to	 that	 advocated	 by	 von	 Foerster.	This	 is	significant	for	von	Foerster’s	position	in	two	ways.	Firstly,	while	von	Foerster’s	call	 to	 keep	 ethics	 implicit	 can	 seem	 idealistic,	 not	 just	 in	 design	 but	 also	 in	 complex	social	situations	more	generally,	we	can	see	design	as	a	way	of	acting,	applicable	even	in	complex	and	ethical	 charged	 circumstances,	 in	which	 this	 is	 achieved	 to	 at	 least	 some	extent.	Secondly,	the	context	of	design	offers	a	realm	in	which	to	develop	von	Foerster’s	position,	circumventing	the	difficulty	of	extending	it	either	theoretically	or	through	case	studies	 given	 that	 such	 articulation	 may,	 according	 to	 its	 own	 account,	 lead	 to	moralisation.		Like	 conversation	 more	 generally	 (Glanville,	 2004),	 design	 requires	 ethical	considerations	of	this	sort	in	order	to	be	practiced	well	in	its	own	terms.	That	there	are	ethical	 considerations	 already	 implicit	 in	 core	 design	 activities	 suggests	 that	we	 need	not	see	 the	relationship	between	ethics	and	design,	as	 is	so	often	 the	case,	 in	 terms	of	trade-offs	between	the	two.	This	is	to	shift	the	focus	of	the	relationship	between	ethics	and	 design	 away	 from	 the	 application	 of	 ethical	 theories	 or	 standards	 with	 which	 to	correct	 practice.	 Instead	 of	making	 judgements	 about	what	 is	 ethically	 good,	which	 is	often	impossible	or	even	counterproductive,	we	might	instead	focus	on	how	and	to	what	extent	 designers	 incorporate	 ethical	 consideration	 within	 their	 design	 activity,	 a	question	that	can	be	addressed	independently	of	the	contestability	of	the	results	of	such	considerations.		Such	 an	 approach	might	 be	 extended	 to	 how	we	 speak	 and	 reason	 about	 ethics	 itself,	understood,	 as	 introduced	 above,	 as	 an	 activity	 to	which	 ethical	 considerations	 apply.	For	 instance,	 it	 is	 striking	 that	 the	 two	 most	 common	 forms	 of	 normative	 ethical	theory—consequentialism	 and	 deontology—exclude	 the	 sort	 of	 implicit	 ethical	consideration	that	I	have	noted	to	be	present	in	design.	In	following	predefined	rules	or	optimising	 against	 set	 goals,	 one	 cannot	 take	 the	 views	 of	 others	 into	 account,	 take	personal	 responsibility	 for	 one’s	 action	 or	 pursue	 purposes	 internal	 to	 it	 because,	 by	adopting	such	an	approach,	one’s	course	of	action	is	already	set.	This	accounts	in	part,	I	suggest,	for	what	Alasdair	MacIntyre	(1981/1985)	has	observed	to	be	the	“shrill	tone”	of	modern	ethical	debate,	 something	which	 is	 in	desperate	need	of	 reform,	a	 task	which,	perhaps	surprisingly,	design	might	contribute	to.		
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